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Abstract 
Despite ChinaÕs regulatory initiatives to promote its research accountability, it still needs to prove itself as a 
trusted player in life science research. In addition, in contrast to its huge investment, China is losing the race 
in delivering quality application of stem cells. The trial implementation of the 2015 ministerial regulations 
seemed to offer hope in ending this dual Ôlost-in-translationÕ. Yet skepticism remains. By examining ChinaÕs 
regulatory trajectory in the last 15 years, this paper illustrates that it is a post-hoc pragmatic policy rationale 
and a soft centralisation regulatory approach that have hampered ChinaÕs governance. To improve ChinaÕs 
governance of accountability, policy-makers need to get beyond an Ôact-in-responseÕ regulatory ethos and 
engage with diverse stakeholders. 
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In the last two decades, China has marched towards its stem cell ambition with big and bold strides. Being 
the worldÕs second largest investor of stem cell research, the number of stem cell researchers in China has 
grown by 16 times since 2004, while the amount of academic publications has increased by 17 times [1]. In 
addition, rising clinical trials in China since 2008 has put Asia above North America and Europe in terms of 
numbers of experimental therapies [2]. Yet this huge investment of financial and human resources, along 
with socio-political encouragement, has not resulted in ChinaÕs competitive advantage as a global leader in 
this field. Despite the fact that a number of companies in Europe, the US, South Korea, Canada and Japan 
have received market approval for their stem cell-based products from their respective jurisdictions, in the 
eyes of Chinese researchers, the prospect for Chinese institutions to translate its laboratory findings into 
marketable stem cell-based products in the next five years remains dim [3]. In fact, the ill reputation of being 
the hotbed for unsupervised clinical trials has crippled ChinaÕs translation of stem cell promises [4].  
It was not until August 2015, when ChinaÕs National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) and 
ChinaÕs Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) jointly authorised the trial implementation of a set of long 
waited regulations that the field of clinical stem cell research in China restored some order [5, 6]. Whilst this 
new set of policies has, at least domestically, introduced renewed optimism, a poor record of policy en-
forcement and a lack of regulatory clarity and consistency still loom over Chinese scientific practitioners and 
biomedical industry [7]. As one industrial scientist rightly argued in China Medical Biotechnology, with the 
promulgation of the 2015 regulations, China may be at the crossroads of becoming a leading player in world 
stem cells. If China gets its governance right, it could become a powerhouse for innovation. If the enforce-
ment of the 2015 regulations turn sour, it could potentially create an insuperable ÔDeath ValleyÕ between 
ChinaÕs ambitions in the labs and their bedside applications [8]. 
Thus the field of clinical stem cell research in China is confronting two interrelated Ôlost-in-translationsÕ. 
One is the failed translation of stem cell potential into reliable medical practices. The other is the failed trans-
lation of a permissive policy stance into a supportive research environment.  
By systematically reviewing the development of ChinaÕs stem cell regulations, this paper investigates the 
regulatory culture that gives rise to ChinaÕs dual Ôlost-in-translationsÕ. I argue that it is a post-hoc pragmatic 
policy rationale and a soft centralisation regulatory approach that have damaged the effectiveness of ChinaÕs 
stem cell governance. This is not to overlook the tremendous governance progress the Chinese government 
and Chinese scientific community have made in the last two decades. Rather the point is to identify possible 
impediments to the deliverance of accountable governance in China. For China to improve its research ac-
countability, policy-makers need to get beyond a conventional Ôact-in-responseÕ regulatory ethos and con-
struct a socially-embedded regulatory system that engages with diverse stakeholders. 
Post-hoc pragmatism and its effects on accountable research 
The making of Chinese biomedical policies can be characterised as a practice of Ôpost-hoc pragmatismÕ[9]. 
Here the term ÔpragmatismÕ denotes a reluctance to engage with wider social value debates and a consequent 
narrow focus on finding quick administrative-fixes on identifiable problems and expressed concerns. Lead-
ing Chinese bioethicist Wang Yanguang described a common view that Chinese regulators in the health sec-
tor were dismissive in incorporating social debates into policy making for Ôhowever laudable the goalsÕ, get-
ting into the messiness of public views appears to be an ÔinefficientÕ way to govern [10]. Policy-making for 
the life sciences, Wang argued, was oriented towards promoting the international stance of Chinese science 
[10]. Subsequently, Chinese biogovernance is often post-hoc in the sense of being reactionary to in-
ternational criticisms as opposed to being precautionary. The making of ChinaÕs regulatory system of clinical 
stem cell research mirrors this policy orientation. As this section demonstrates, in comparison to many other 
countries, domestic concerns have played a relatively a small role in ChinaÕs policy making over stem cell 
research. The current regulatory framework is founded on a series of responses Chinese authorities have 
made towards international criticism [11, 12]. The fact that Chinese stem cell policies have been largely 
steered by global perceptions rather than domestic concerns can be seen both in basic stem cell research (as 
shown in the 2003 example discussed below) and in related clinical studies (as shown in the 2009 example 
below). The pressure to address global scrutiny whilst preserving domestic creativity has led to a pragmatic 
search for regulatory patchworks which may appear disruptive to research. 
2003 arguably marked the beginning of ChinaÕs national regulation on stem cell research, in which ChinaÕs 
main research funder, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), joined efforts with the then Ministry 
of Health (MOH, predecessor of NHFPC) in promulgating the Ethical Guidelines for Research on Human 
Embryonic Stem Cells [13]. According to bioethicists who participated in the making of the guidelines, this 
was a government response to the ÔWild EastÕ characterisation that had been placed on China since Chen 
XiguÕs 2001 creation of the worldÕs first human-rabbit hybrid embryos in the absence of ethical review [9, 
14]. More importantly, the scope of this Guideline was intentionally kept narrow so as to address immediate 
global concerns, rather than taking a more proactive steering of domestic research norms [15]. The resulting 
2003 Guidelines was mainly a repetition of existing Western ethical principles with little procedural guidance 
on how it could be carried out. As such, domestically this Guideline functioned Ômore of as educational ma-
terial than an operational directiveÕ [9]. 
In the years that followed, China gradually became a destination for desperate patients around the world to 
receive unproven and unregulated stem cell treatments [4, 16]. Just as China was beginning to shrug off the 
ÔWild EastÕ notoriety, a new wave of global criticism arose over ChinaÕs regulatory vacuum over stem cell 
therapies [17]. 
In response to growing skepticism, in May 2009, MOH promulgated the Regulations of Clinical Application 
of Medical Technology. This 2009 Regulations categorised stem cells as a high risk ÔClass IIIÕ medical tech-
nology, which is defined as Ôhaving major ethical and safety concerns, with clinical efficacy yet to be 
testedÕ [17]. By listing stem cells as a Class III medical technology, the 2009 Regulations brought stem cell 
related research under the direct supervision of the Ministry [17]. This was a key step to centralise the gov-
ernmentÕs control over clinical stem cell research. Yet to some extent, similar to the 2003 Guidelines, this 
policy response was more of a positional statement to appease international criticism than a practical solution 
to enhance domestic oversight. For example, following the publication of the 2009 Regulations, in theory, 
institutions engaged with clinical research of stem cells were given until 31 October 2009 to file for minister-
ial approval if they wished to continue their respective research. In practice, the lack of procedural specificity 
and an absence of non-compliance penalties meant that for most practitioners, it was business as usual [17]. 
In fact, it was estimated that at least 200 hospitals in China continued to offer unproven therapies [18]. Chi-
nese authorities had little influence over companies such as Belike Biotechnology which claimed to supply 
stem cells to hospitals for treatment of a wide range of conditions [18, 19]. 
As criticism persisted, Chinese authorities resorted to a more drastic approach. That is, at the beginning of 
2012, MOH halted all stem cell clinical research and clinical applications that were not approved by MOH 
and State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA, renamed as ChinaÕs Food and Drug Administration in 
2013) and suspended ministerial review of new clinical stem cell research applications to July 2012 [20]. But 
three months after MOH announced its intention to clamp down on illegal practices, a Nature investigation 
found that Ôbusinesses around the country are still charging patients thousands of dollars for these unproven 
therapiesÕ [21]. As the next section further elucidates, the failure of MOHÕs 2012 intervention was but one 
example of how relying on conventional top-down administrative commands alone significantly limited the 
steering of clinical stem cell research. A number of empirical studies rightly suggested that effective deter-
rence of stem cell tourism requires policy makers to understand and to engage with diverse interests. In addi-
tion to the promotion of scientific transparency and public education, regulators need to channel rather than 
to simply negate stem cellsÕ commercial appeal [22, 23]. More importantly, only in this way can regulators 
perform a fine balancing act between irresponsible exploitation of desperate patients and innovative clinical 
practice [24]. 
To summarise, the first decade of ChinaÕs attempt to govern research accountability was ineffective. Existing 
studies on ChinaÕs stem cell regulations have identified factors such as a lack of procedural clarity, the frag-
mentation of regulatory responsibilities and ambiguities with non-compliance penalties, as impediments to 
good governance [25, 26, 27]. Yet a post-hoc pragmatic mindset may be a deeper reason to regulatory inef-
fectiveness.  
There is nothing essentially wrong with being Ôpost-hocÕ (i.e. reactionary) or being ÔpragmaticÕ (i.e. narrowly 
focused on addressing a particular criticism). But when a regulatory system is dominated by post-hoc prag-
matism, it reduces accountable governance to crisis-management. It seems that Chinese regulators may have 
had wrongly equated permissive governance to parachuting in regulatory directives only when specific in-
ternational concerns had been voiced [10]. Governance is then not so much founded on engaging with wider 
social values but on chasing after criticism. This seemingly pragmatic calculation arguably had turned the 
foundation and objectives of policies upside-down. A second consequence of a post-hoc pragmatic orienta-
tion is that it curtailed regulatory consistency and coherency which were crucial for scientific advancement.  
ChinaÕs 2013 circulation of a set of three draft regulations on stem cell clinical trials was seen as a turning 
point. It was ChinaÕs first attempt to break away from relying on regulatory patchworks, to systematically 
introduce a set of regulatory tools to safeguard accountable research. This joint effort by MOH and the 
SFDA aimed to provide guidance both on the organisation and conduct of clinical trials along with quality 
control standards [28, 29, 30]. These draft regulations clarified a few key issues. For example, they made an 
administrative distinction between approved stem cell treatments and stem cell clinical trials. Any form of 
marketisation or fee-charging were prohibited for clinical trials. This distinction is important, as at the time, 
the Chinese government had officially recognised only one type of stem cell treatment, that is, the use of 
hematopoietic stem cells in hematological diseases (e.g. leukaemia). Thus, the 2013 draft regulations effec-
tively brought all other clinical applications of stem cells under the umbrella of non-fee-charging practices. 
This was expected to reduce financial incentives for hospitals to recruit patients for approval-pending thera-
pies. Furthermore, the draft regulations made an explicit requirement that clinical trials needed to be central-
ly registered, approved and annually reviewed by the MOH and SFDA. But similar to previous policies, 
these 2013 regulations were vague on the procedural details of how such approvals could be made and to 
whom. Consequently, while the 2013 regulations offered a glimmer of hope for a more orderly development 
of clinical stem cell research in China, it also effectively paralysed many government funded projects and 
created frustrations among practitioners [31]. 
The 2013 draft formed the basis of current trial implementations of Management of Clinical Trial Research 
on Stem Cells and Guideline for Quality Control and Preclinical Studies of Stem cell Preparations promul-
gated in August 2015 [5, 32]. Following these regulations the newly formed NHFPC and ChinaÕs Food and 
Drug Administration (CFDA) were responsible to organise expert committees to certify, register and review 
clinical stem cell research in China [33]. This time, the 2015 regulations offered better procedural clarity on 
how approvals could be obtained. Thus, after a few years of waiting in suspense, Chinese principal investiga-
tors finally had some certainty over how to proceed with their research agenda [6]. The May 2016 an-
nouncement of the first 30 authorised institutions for stem cell research seemed to be an initial testimony to 
regulatory efficiency [34]. 
As Chinese authorities embarked on a more systematic approach to reform stem cell regulations, there 
seemed to be a reason for optimism. But Chinese regulators may still need to appreciate the value of having 
regulatory resilience and consistency. One example is that while the introduction of the 2015 regulations 
were widely welcomed by Chinese practitioners as signaling a Ônew springÕ to stem cell research, the death 
of 21-year old college student Wei Zexi who was receiving experimental cell therapy at BeijingÕs Number 
Two Armed Policy Hospital in 2016 froze this field with an unexpected Ôcold snapÕ [35]. The death of a ter-
minally-ill young man shocked the Chinese public for it was seen as an epitome of a number of social prob-
lems associated with health care, such as under-regulated medical advertisements, incomplete informed con-
sent and a disregard to NHFPCÕs prohibition on fee-charging for experimental therapies [36]. With mounting 
media criticisms of WeiÕs death, NHFPC effectively made a blanket ban on clinical applications of cell im-
munotherapy, which was a large area of clinical stem cell research [35, 37]. This decision seems to be remi-
niscent of how Chinese health authorities responded to the controversies on hybrid embryo research and on 
stem cell therapies. A disputable practice was pragmatically terminated to quiet social discussion in the short 
run. For the regulators, such pragmatism perhaps offers powerful and ÔeffectiveÕ answers to (political) ac-
countabilities, but for scientific practitioners, its impact may be more disruptive than constructive. 
Another weakness in ChinaÕs governance system which Wei Zexi's case exposed was that, the hospital he 
received treatment from was a police hospital which was regulated by the military and fell outside of the ju-
risdictions of NHFPC. This further exposed the irony to NHFPCÕs supposed ÔpragmaticÕ regulatory rationale, 
which was, arguably, far from ÔpracticalÕ. That is, NHFPCÕs blanket ban on cell immunotherapy not only 
wrongly penalised practitioners in civic laboratories and hospitals, but it also failed to address the actual 
problem in WeiÕs case, that is, the jurisdiction divide between civil and military medical facilities. To com-
plicate the regulatory landscape further, another reason for the lack of institutional oversight in WeiÕs case 
was because the military hospital outsourced its entire Tumour Biology Centre to a private company. These 
layers of contractual relations are not rare in ChinaÕs health system and have highlighted the tension between 
ChinaÕs existing divisions of regulatory responsibilities and the evolving structures of biomedical practices. 
As is further discussed in the next section, this poses a new challenge to Chinese authorities to adapt its poli-
cy approach so as to cope with increasingly diversified research and application practices. 
Emerging blind spots in Ôsoft centralisationÕ 
The previous section demonstrated that ChinaÕs stem cell regulatory initiatives were often prompted by a 
Ôpragmatic' search for a quick political response towards existing outcries. To clamp down on irresponsible 
research, the devising of policies has relied on what I termed a Ôsoft centralisationÕ approach. Its meaning and 
effects are elucidated below in two steps. 
Firstly, centralised administrative authority and centralised control over access to national research resources 
were once seen by Chinese regulators as a crucial gatekeeper to keep the stem cell community within a man-
ageable scope [9]. For example, ChinaÕs clinical stem cell research once depended on a host institutionÕs dis-
cretionary adaptation of international guidelines [38]. But through the succession of new regulatory moves in 
2009, 2013 and 2015, as discussed in the previous section, the accreditation and annual reviews of stem cell 
clinical research centres are centralised to the authorities of two state agencies, NHFPC and CFDA [28, 29]. 
More importantly, Chinese ministries centralised control over the allocation of national funding and re-
sources was considered as a de facto determinant on who are allowed into a certain research field [39]. Ac-
cording to the new 2015 regulations, to qualify as site for stem cells trials, the prospect institution needs to 
be a ÔTier 3 Level AÕ hospital. The term ÔTier 3Õ signifies the concerned hospital is a Tertiary institution, 
which can deliver medical care, medical education, and conduct medical research. Each Tier is further divid-
ed into 3 subsidiary levels to differentiate its capacity on basis of its size, service provisions and management 
and professional assessment. ÔLevel AÕ marks the highest rank. In addition, the regulations also required that 
prospect institutions to be part of national Ômajor research projectÕ and had a competitive funding record 
[33]. In a country where state funding has been the main, and sometimes the only source for scientific devel-
opment and where major grants are often 'commissioned' rather than awarded to selected individuals [39], it 
could be argued that these criteria have effectively limited the clinical research of stem cells to a relatively 
small circle of elite practitioners who are the beneficiaries of state-sponsorship.  
This instrumentalisation of access to resources as a governing tool for research accountability is not new to 
China. One only needs to recall that after the promulgation of the 2003 Ethical Guidelines for Research on 
Human Embryonic Stem Cells, its vague terminology and a lack of operational details cast doubt on its actu-
al impact [22]. To Western critics, such guidelines were far from sufficient and China still suffered from an 
absence of Ôclear national policies, with different institutions following different rulesÕ [40]. However, in a 
correspondence published in Nature, a group of Chinese scientists rebuked such characterisation, and de-
fended that the 2003 Guidelines were Ôadequate, as nearly all scientific research in China relie[d] on gov-
ernment fundingÕ [41]. Thus, at least in the eyes of institutional scientists, centralised funding was an effec-
tive governing leverage over what research could be done and under what conditions. For it used to be true 
that the field of stem cell research in China mainly (if not solely) consisted of practitioners associated with 
state-sponsored institutions. 
However, as stem cell research continued to expand and develop over the last decade, centralised state fund-
ing started to lose its influence in restricting research communities in China. While it may still be true that 
government funding remains central to basic research, the marketisation of experimental stem cell therapies 
and related stem cell products are increasingly independent of state support. In fact, despite the fact that Chi-
na has yet to deliver and to approve a marketable stem cell-based product, private investments have already 
wagered on stem cell-related research. When the government announced its three draft regulations on clinical 
stem cell research in 2013, the prospect of five stem cell related concept stocks rising in market value hit the 
news [42]. Similarly, after the promulgation of the 2015 regulations, ChinaÕs domestic market was infused 
with excitement, with projections that stem cell-based regenerative medicine would reach 150 billion Chi-
nese yuan (approximately 22 billion US dollars) in 2021[43]. Currently it is estimated that China has 200 
companies engaged with stem cell-related research and innovations [37], which are itching to push forward 
stem cell trials as institutional scientists [44]. In addition, as is demonstrated by the Wei Zexi case, the 
boundaries between private and public medical service providers are increasingly blurred by an entangled 
web of interests. 
Thus a question mark should be put on the assumed effectiveness of a centralised approach in China [39]. As 
the field of clinical stem cell research is increasingly crowded with myriads of private investments and 
commercial interests, simply denouncing practices outside of Tier 3 Level A hospitals as illegal, as the 2015 
regulations did, may not be enough to either improve ChinaÕs public accountability in clinical stem cell re-
search or protect vulnerable patients. In late April 2017, just as the NHFPC and CFDA started to accept new 
clinical stem cell research accreditation applications from elite institutions, investigative reporters from the 
China Youth Daily exposed that the eligibility criteria used in the 2015 regulations simply forced hundreds of 
existing but not-yet-registered stem cell clinics, such as those based in Tier 3 Level B hospitals, to operate 
underground [45, 46]. The root of this enforcement problem of the 2015 regulations, as succinctly pointed 
out by distinguished stem cell scientist Chaozhong Han was that the old rationale of governing by limiting 
certain practices to a select few no longer reflected the actual scope of ChinaÕs clinical stem cell research. In 
the words of Han, this centralisation approach was Ôten years too lateÕ since patientsÕ expectations, cliniciansÕ 
ambitions and intense commercial interests have already taken off and cannot be simply dispelled by admin-
istrative orders [46]. Effective governance may require a more proactive engagement with diverse players in 
the field of stem cell research. 
Secondly and relatedly, what further lessens the effectiveness of the centralisation strategy is the fragmented 
nature of the Chinese political system. The enforcement of Chinese ministriesÕ regulative schemes often 
hinges on varying degrees of commitments by different regional authorities and by other ministries with 
overlapping jurisdictions [47]. As briefly mentioned in the previous section, there are two parallel health au-
thorities in China. Civil hospitals are under the jurisdictions of NHFPC, while military and armed police 
hospitals are subjected to the regulations of the China PeopleÕs Liberation ArmyÕs General Logistics Depart-
ment [20]. Regulations promulgated by civil authorities, such as the prohibition of hospitalsÕ subcontracting 
its medical service to private providers, do not automatically apply to military hospitals. In addition, regional 
governments in China often have more autonomy than commonly assumed. It is not rare for local protection 
of economic interests to trump ministerial agendas [49]. Thus, ChinaÕs stem cell policies to date are ÔsoftÕ 
regulations not least in the sense that they are not yet laws, but also in the sense that their impacts are re-
duced by the negotiated implementation of regulators at different levels [7].  
This further highlights the importance to collaborate and coordinate with diverse stakeholders and practition-
ers if national regulations were to have nation-wide effects. In some cases, inattentiveness to research activi-
ties outside centralised funding schemes may create an adverse situation in which Ôthe bad drives out the 
goodÕ. For example, during my fieldwork as Expert Consultant for the Ministry of Science commissioned 
project, ÔEthical Issues and Governing Strategies in Scientific ResearchÕ in 2014 [48], one stem cell scientist 
at Tongji University complained to us that as the then MOH had prohibited unauthorised stem cell research, 
his state-funded project was effectively suspended until further clarity from the government. In the mean-
time, rival researchers working in the commercial sector forged ahead, for their careers and future funding 
were independent from the state system. This is an illuminating anecdote on the ÔsoftÕ or limited-mandatory 
nature of China stem cell regulations and on how exiting centralised control falls short in acquiring full 
command of this field. 
In short, ChinaÕs stem cell research has largely been regulated through Ôsoft centralisationÕ. That is, cen-
tralised control over national funding and administrative approval were once considered as an effective Ôpuri-
fyingÕ mechanism to contain research practices [41]. But as stem cell community continued to evolve, the 
pertinence of such an approach to the complex and entangled web of research should not be taken for grant-
ed. It may prematurely restrict the regulatory efficacy, and may also create a punitive impact on those who 
follow the rules. 
Governing Accountability and Accountable Governance: A Reflection 
Supporting stem cell research is strategic for China to establish leadership in global science. The last two 5-
year-plans for scientific development has identified clinical stem cell research as a special programme under 
the Major National Scientific Research Plan [50]. But to translate this commitment into scientific impact, 
China still needs to prove itself as a Ôtrusted player in the competitive and skeptical global community of life 
scientistsÕ [51]. Unless China turns around its imprudent reputation in clinical stem cell research, it may fail 
to attract the best scientists and collaborators as well as constrain the progress of its application and marketi-
sation of stem cells [31, 52].  
To improve ChinaÕs governance of accountability, in addition to exploring new ways to hold scientific practi-
tioners and relevant stockholders (e.g. hospitals, companies) responsible for their conduct, regulatory bodies 
also need to be held accountable to the policies they set forth. More specifically, the delivery of effective 
governance may benefit from a reflection on what national regulations should take into account and for 
whom the policies should be held accountable to. This is where recognising the roles post-hoc pragmatism 
and soft centralisation played in ChinaÕs stem cell policies helps. 
Firstly, as rightly pointed out by Sleeboom-Faulkner [53], ChinaÕs attitude towards science governance was 
oriented towards promoting Ôinnovation and developmentÕ rather than attending Ômoral scruplesÕ. In Presi-
dent Xi JinpingÕs 2016 address to the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Chinese Academy of Engineering, a 
dominance in stem cell science and its associated applications was described as a Ôsolid supportÕ for socio-
economic development, and as emblematic of China becoming a global power [54]. China has been Ôprag-
maticÕ with stem cell regulations in the sense that, for the larger part of the past two decades, Chinese author-
ities have relied on regulatory patchworks to govern clinical stem cell research and have avoided embedding 
its policy-making in wider social value debates. Key regulatory steps were taken mainly in response to in-
ternational skepticism. Arguably, this minimalist approach to stem cell policies may have allowed Chinese 
scientists to gain some head start in this field. But as this field started to mature and normalise globally, an 
absence of clear and justifiable regulatory support has often left Chinese stem cell research in a limbo. In 
addition, a ÔpragmaticÕ fix to identifiable concerns has increasingly appeared to be disruptive rather than sen-
sible. One only need to be reminded of the scientific cost of what followed the hybrid embryo controversies 
more than a decade ago. Despite the fact that non-reproductive cloning is officially allowed in China, con-
fronting with international skepticism over Chinese scientistsÕ of the first hybrid embryo for research pur-
pose, China effectively put a total ban on such research so as to silence criticism. This research was later 
picked up by the United Kingdom seven years later, by which time Chinese research had lost the lead [9]. 
Similar interruptive decisions were also seen in the 2012 moratorium of stem cell clinical trials and recent 
ban on cell immunotherapy as discussed in previous sections. Thus to translate permissive regulatory inten-
tion into encouraging and supportive governance, a reframing of policy orientations may be necessary. 
Secondly, a more proactive and socially-embedded regulatory system also implies a step away from what 
policy researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences described as Ôa linear understanding of innovationÕ, 
which leads to policies that fail to speak to the intricate web of interests and collaborations that are integral 
to contemporary science [55]. For ChinaÕs governance over clinical stem cell research to be full-fledged, in 
addition to relying on centralised administrative control, it will need to confront the messiness of clinical 
reality and make more effort to engage with relevant authorities and diverse stakeholders. 
Conclusion  
To some extent, China appears to be a crippled giant in the world of clinical stem cell research. While it has 
the ambition and the resource to become a global leader in this field, China remains haunted by an Ôimage 
problemÕ created by the governmentÕs inability to whip increasingly diverse practices and interests into regu-
latory order and social credibility. By examining ChinaÕs regulatory trajectory in the last 15 years, this paper 
illustrates that it is the post-hoc pragmatic policy rationale and a soft centralisation regulatory approach that 
have caused a Ôlost in translationÕ of ChinaÕs huge scientific potential.  
More specifically, this paper points out that the reason Chinese regulatorsÕ ÔpragmaticÕ approach to stem cell 
regulation often seems to be least practical was that the reluctance to inform policies with wider social de-
bates has reduced government regulations to crisis-management. While putting administrative restriction 
over the number of eligible players in clinical stem cell research domestically may appear to be a direct and 
effective way to restore order, this old ÔcentralisationÕ rationale does not reflect the actual scope of current 
stem cell research in China nor does it addresses ChinaÕs fragmented regulatory structure. Thus, for ChinaÕs 
governance of research accountability to bear fruit, Chinese regulators need to first have a candid reflection 
on what constitutes accountable governance that is pertinent to the Chinese context. This includes the will-
ingness to recognise expectations and concerns from diverse stakeholders. It also requires the determination 
to step out of the top-down approach and to work out a socially-embedded regulatory framework with vari-
ous interest groups (e.g. patients, scientists, companies, local government, military authorities) from the bot-
tom-up. 
Future Perspective 
In the spring of 2017, China launched the worldÕs first clinical trial in using human embryonic stem (ES) 
cells to treat ParkinsonÕs disease [56] and founded a new Ôcell factoryÕ dedicated to the production of thera-
peutic stem cells for neurodegenerative disease in Guangzhou [57]. There is little doubt that in the next 5-10 
years, China clinical stem cell research will continue to forge ahead. But for China to become a trusted pow-
erhouse in global clinical stem cell research, a more transparent and structured governing framework that 
speaks to existing entangled web of interests is needed. This is perhaps a lesson Chinese regulators have only 
started to recognise.  
Executive Summary  
¥ ChinaÕs clinical stem cell research confronts two interrelated Ôlost-in-translationsÕ:1) the failed translation 
of stem cell potential into reliable medical practices; 2) the failed translation of a permissive policy stance 
into a supportive research environment. 
Post-hoc pragmatism and its effects on accountable research 
¥ The making of Chinese stem cell policies resembles a practice of Ôpost-hoc pragmatismÕ, which is orient-
ed more towards seeking quick appeasement of criticisms than towards shaping research norms. 
¥ The 2003 Ethical Guidelines for Research on Human Embryonic Stem Cells was promulgated in response 
to the ÔWild EastÕ characterisation which resulted from ChinaÕs creation of the worldÕs first human-rabbit 
hybrid embryos.  
¥ To address global concerns over stem cell tourism, the 2009 Regulations of Clinical Application of Med-
ical Technology attempted to centralise the governmentÕs control over this field. But a lack of procedural 
consideration pertinent to the Chinese context rendered it little operability. 
¥ The 2013 circulation of a set of three draft regulations on stem cell clinical trials was ChinaÕs first attempt 
to systematically reform this field. The subsequent 2015 adoption of these draft regulations restored some 
order to this field. However, the Wei Zexi's case in 2016 exposed that post-hoc pragmatism mentality re-
mains. 
Emerging blind spots in Ôsoft centralisationÕ 
¥ Centralised administrative authority and centralised control over access to national research resources were 
once considered as a crucial gatekeeper to keep the stem cell community within a manageable scope. 
¥ The development of stem cell community challenges this centralisation rationale, as the boundaries be-
tween private and public medical service providers are increasingly blurred by an entangled web of finan-
cial interests. 
¥ In addition, the reality of jurisdiction divided between the civil and military medical facilities and between 
national and local governments curtails regulatory efficacy. 
Governing Accountability and Accountable Governance: A Reflection 
¥ Safeguarding research accountability relies not on one-sided instruction, but depends on mutual commit-
ments from the regulator and the regulated. In addition to exploring new ways to hold practitioners respon-
sible for their conduct, regulatory bodies also need to be held accountable to the policies they set forth. 
¥ Accountable governance also requires a step away from a linear understanding of innovation and recognis-
es the intricate web of interests and collaborations that are integral to contemporary science. 
Conclusion 
¥ The reason Chinese regulatorsÕ ÔpragmaticÕ approach to stem cell regulation often seems to be least practi-
cal was that the reluctance to inform policies with wider social debate has reduced government regulations 
to crisis-management.  
¥ Whilst putting administrative restriction over the number of eligible players in clinical stem cell research 
may appear to be an effective way to restore order, this old ÔcentralisationÕ rationale does not reflect the 
actual scope of stem cell research in China nor does it addresses ChinaÕs fragmented regulatory structure.  
Future Perspective 
¥ The prospect of China becoming a trusted powerhouse in clinical stem cell research hinges on Chinese 
regulatorsÕ willingness to work out a socially-embedded regulatory framework with diverse stakeholders 
from the bottom-up. 
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